Scotland Can Veto Brexit (sort of …) by Mac Amhlaigh, Cormac
Scotland Can Veto Brexit (sort of …).
 verfassungsblog.de /scotland-can-veto-brexit-sort-of/
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh Di 28 Jun 2016
And so it has come to pass. What many thought was unthinkable has happened. The UK will leave the European
Union. Many questions still remain unanswered in the heady days after the momentous vote on Thursday last
week, not least the role of the UK’s devolved regions in all of this.
The day after the vote, and shortly after the Prime Minister David Cameron had announced his resignation,
Nicola Sturgeon, leader of the Scottish National Party and First Minister of Scotland gave a confident
stateswomenlike speech. Quoting from the SNP’s manifesto of last month’s Scottish Parliamentary elections she
stated that where a majority of the UK voted to leave the EU but a majority of Scotland voted to stay, that this
would constitute the ‘material change in circumstances’ which would trigger a new independence referendum.
The fact that Scotland voted by 62% to stay in the EU whereas the UK as a whole voted by 52% to leave, mean,
she said, that a second Scottish Independence Referendum was firmly back on the agenda again.
On Sunday morning, she further noted in an interview with the BBC, that she would veto any attempt by a future
British government to effect the withdrawal of the UK from the EU following the referendum result. This has
raised a flurry of questioning of whether this is actually constitutionally permissible.
In this blogpost I will argue why I think it is; that is that the Scottish Parliament does, constitutionally, have the
power to use the constitution to attempt to veto an attempt by a British government to take the United Kingdom
out of the European Union.
Legislative Consent Motions
 Firstly, a brief primer on the constitutional relationship between the British and Scottish Parliaments. The
Scottish Parliament was established by an Act of the Westminster parliament, the Scotland Act 1998, but the
main constitutional mechanism regulating this relationship is the Sewell convention (named after the
Parliamentarian who announced the policy during the passage of the Scotland Act 1998). This Convention was
recently codified in (another) Scotland Act in 2016 which formulates the convention in the following way:
‘it is recognized that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard
to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’
As such, the convention provides that Westminster will, all things being equal, request the permission of the
Scottish Parliament to pass legislation on issues on which the Scottish Parliament has competence. This
‘permission’ takes the form of a Legislative Consent Motion (LCM) of the Scottish parliament as a means of
endorsing legislation from the UK Parliament which affects an area of policy that has been devolved.
Whereas this has been interpreted as relating exclusively to legislating on matters under the competence of the
Scottish Parliament at any particular time,[1] it now seems clear that it also extends to the modification of the
powers of the devolved institutions through amendments to the Scotland Act.[2] That is, any attempt to vary the
powers of the Scottish Parliament, whether to restrict or augment its legislative or administrative powers,
requires the permission of the Scottish Parliament in the form of a Legislative Consent Motion. The invocation of
the convention during the passage of the Scotland Act 2012 arguably confirms this position.
Of course, notwithstanding the existence of the Sewell Convention applying to the relationship between the two
legislatures, under the British constitution it remains a convention not a formal rule of positive law. That is that it
is a norm of political understanding between the parliaments rather than a legally enforceable rule. It is clear that
the Westminster Parliament retains the power, in law to legislate on areas over which the Scottish Parliament
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has competence and can ignore the protestations of a Scottish Parliament to give effect to EU withdrawal. An
aggrieved Scottish parliament would have no recourse to the courts to air their grievance; generally speaking a
court will not entertain an action based on breach of a convention as it is not generally considered a rule of
formal constitutional law.
It is political enforcement which gives the convention its bite such that any attempt by the Westminster
parliament to act in breach of the convention would have significant political ramifications; potentially sparking a
constitutional crisis. As such the ‘veto’ is consequential rather than normative, that is it is a threat to spark a
constitutional crisis, rather than a power to formally legally stop Brexit, which is at stake.
The Sewel Convention and EU Law
There are two ways in which the Sewell convention is implicated in the question of the UK’s departure from the
EU: 1) Relating to the EU law-related powers in the Scotland Act 1998 based on the European Communities Act
1972 and 2) EU law-related powers under the definition of ‘EU law’ contained in the Scotland Act 1998.
1. The European Communities Act 1972
 The European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) is the legal measure which essentially gives effect to the UK’s EU
Membership. It is the portal through which the vast amount of EU law is recognised and enforced within the UK
as well as providing for its direct effect and for the jurisdiction of the EU courts. Whereas the most significant
powers contained in the ECA are within the exclusive competence of the Westminster Parliament, some of the
powers under the ECA have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament to ensure the uniform implementation of
EU law. In particular:
the powers of the Scottish government to observe and implement EU law through executive powers,
the duty of Scottish government to have regard to the objectives of the EU when exercising powers
granted by an Act of the Scottish Parliament
the power of the Parliament to annul the exercise of statutory powers by the Scottish government for
failure to have regard to the objectives of the EU
Even if the devolved powers of the ECA are relatively limited, a repeal of the ECA to give legal effect to Brexit
would trigger the Sewell convention given the way the ECA is embedded in the Scotland Act in the devolution of
powers to the Scottish Parliament.
Firstly, the power of Scottish ministers to implement EU law and the powers of the Scottish parliament to annul
orders of Scottish ministers interpreting EU law rely on interpretations of the ECA. Repealing the ECA without
subsequently amending the Scotland Act would mean that the administrative powers devolved to the Scottish
government would be powers stemming from an Act which was not longer in force. This would potentially have
the result of
depriving the Scottish government of the power to implement EU law,
creating a more general power of Scottish ministers to exercise their powers under Acts of the Scottish
Parliament, released from a duty to have regard to the objectives of the EU in so exercising
depriving the Parliament to annul such exercise for failure for having regard to the objectives of EU law.
Alternatively, the non-existence of the Act from which the powers stemmed would result in an augmentation of
those powers in the Scotland Act as they would no longer be constrained by the conditions on the exercise of
those powers contained in the (repealed) ECA. Either way, unilaterally repealing the ECA without subsequently
amending the Scotland Act would simultaneously restrict and augment the powers of the Scottish Parliament
thereby triggering the convention.
Secondly, given that the Scottish Parliament is currently prohibited from doing certain things involving EU law as
these are explicitly the competence of the Westminster parliament (for example determining the effects of EU
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law in the UK and determining the jurisdiction of the EU courts in the UK), a repeal of the ECA to give effect to
Brexit would allow the Scottish parliament to do things it was previously unable to do as the Act containing the
prohibitions would cease to exist. Even if the subsequent ‘knock-on’ amendments were not made to the Scotland
Act to take account of this, this would be a potentially large increase in the powers of the Scottish Parliament,
again triggering the Convention.[3]
1. EU law related powers under the notion of ‘EU law’ embedded in the Scotland Act
1998.
The other main EU law relevant question of the competences of the devolved institutions relates to definition of
EU law within the Scotland Act itself. The Scotland Act deprives the competence of the devolved institutions to
violate EU law stating that any such act which purports to do so is simply ‘not law’. In the Scotland Act, ‘EU law’ is
defined in s. 126(9) as ‘all those rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created
or arising by or under the EU Treaties’, and ‘all those remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by
or under the EU Treaties’. Although this wording is clearly taken from s. 2(1) ECA, no reference is made to the
Act in defining EU law for the purposes of the Scotland Act. (This can be contrasted with the case of ‘Convention
rights’ under the Scotland Act which explicitly rely on the Human Rights Act 1998 for their meaning under s.
126(1) SA.) This has the effect of giving the term ‘EU law’, and the obligations stemming thereunder an
autonomous meaning, for the purposes of the application of the (non-ECA based parts of) the Scotland Act. As
such, EU law has effects vis-à-vis the activities of the devolved institutions independently of the ECA.
Were the UK to repeal the ECA to give effect to Brexit, it would require fresh legislation specifically amending the
Scotland Act in order for Scotland to ‘leave’ the EU as it were, given that EU law has an autonomous meaning
within the SA. This could provide clear grounds for triggering the Convention.
First of all, alongside the specific transfer of executive competences to implement EU law through the provisions
of the ECA discussed above, the Scotland Act arguably also contains a more general non-ECA related power to
implement EU law stemming from the provisions of the Scotland Act itself and in particular its autonomous
definition of EU law. This can be read into para. 7 of Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act which explicitly states that
that the observation and implementation of EU law (autonomously defined in the SA itself) is not a reserved
matter. As such, both the Parliament and Executive have the competence to observe and implement EU law
within their devolved competences, which relates directly to the provisions of the EU treaties themselves through
the autonomous definition in s. 126 SA rather than being channelled through the ECA.
Secondly, legislation would be required to amend the Scotland Act to relieve the devolved institutions from the
obligation to respect EU law to give effect to Brexit. Repealing the ECA would not be enough. This would remove
a significant encumbrance on the legislative and executive competence of the devolved institutions in that they
would then be free to violate EU law and would therefore constitute a major augmentation of the competences of
the devolved institutions thereby triggering the convention.
Of course, Nicola Sturgeon will not veto Brexit legislation of the UK Parliament purely for its own sake. She will
probably try to use a potential veto as leverage for something she wants. The most obvious candidate issue here
is a second independence referendum. Constitutionally speaking, she needs the permission of British parliament
to hold a second independence referendum following the precedent in the transfer of powers from Westminster
to Edinburgh which paved the way for the 2014 independence referendum. It is arguable, then, that this will
become a useful bargaining chip in the ensuing debate about the UK’s future in Europe and Scotland’s future in
the UK and Europe. The constitutional position, however, means that the UK government can ignore Scotland’s
veto, repeal the ECA and amend the Scotland Act to give effect to withdrawal of the EU. This would be
constitutionally permissible but politically highly risky. In the febrile political atmosphere from the resulting
constitutional crisis, Scotland could make a unilateral declaration of independence. What would happen then is
anyone’s guess.
[1] See for example, Lord Sewel’s evidence to the Scottish Parliament Procedures Committee (7 th Report 2005,
The Sewel Convention, SP Paper 4278, Annexe C, 5 October 20015, paras. 8-9).   For discussion see C.
MacCorkindale at the UK Constitutional Law Blog.
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[2] The interpretation given in Devolution Guidance Note 10 and Rule 9B.1 of the standing Orders of the Scottish
Parliament, 4th Edition, 8th Revision (June 2014).
[3] For a similar argument in respect of the Human Rights Act 1998 see Iain Jamieson’s analysis at the UK
Constitutional Law Blog.
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